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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PA TH TO HEAL TH, LLP, an Idaho Limited) 
Liability Partnership, ) 
) 




JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEAGAN ) 
CANNON, husband and wife, DAREN ) 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; ) 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN ) 
REAL TORS, a real estate company ) 






Case No. CV-2012-2195 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Docket No. 42313-2014 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville 
Honorable Joel E, Tingey, District Judge, Presiding 
Na than M, 0 lsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN 
485 E Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Attorney for Appellant 
Donald F. Carey, Esq. 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Dr, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-13 88 
Attorney for Respondents 
Daren Long and AJl-ln Inc., dba 
Re/Max All-In Realtors 
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their response brief, the Respondents did not address Appellant Path to Health's (Path) core 
arguments on appeal. Path has essentially argued that it was an error for the District Court to grant 
summary judgment dismissing its claims when there are clearly disputed material facts as to whether 
Respondents misrepresented and/or failed to make certain disclosures to Path with regard to the zoning 
of the subject Property, and whether such misconduct constituted per se negligence. breach of contract 
and or fraud. Respondents do not really refute this main argument but rather suggest that this Court 
weigh or interpret certain evidence or testimony in their favor, taking that responsibility av.:ay from a 
Jury. 
Respondents also errantly suggest that certain evidence that was part of the record below be 
"excluded" from consideration on appeal because the trial court refused to consider the evidence 
belo,v. However, the standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment requires a "de novo" 
review of the facts, i.e. "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, viewed in most favorable light to the non-moving party to ascertain whether "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Farm Bureau Afut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Eisenman, 153 Idaho 549,286 P.3d 185, (2012). In other 
words, nothing prevents this Court from taking a fresh or "new" look at the record and law relied upon 
by the District Court to determine whether Path's claims should have not been dismissed, but rather 
should go before a jury. Id. Further, Path certainly has raised on appeal the District Court's err in 
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ignoring or othenvise excluding evidence that should ha\e been considered. and in fact form the very 
basis of its appeal. 
As such, Path's basic arguments on appeal largely remain unchallenged. 1\evertheless, critical 
errors in Respondents' brief which further solidify Path's arguments on appeal are addressed belovv. 
I. The Depositions of Dr. Jonak and Carla Elliot Should have been Considered by the 
District Court to Determine whether the Record Consisted of Materially Disputed 
Facts. 
The Respondents claim that in order for deposition testimony to be considered by the trial court 
in response to a summary judgment motion that such depositions need to be attached to a party·s 
affidavit to "verify authenticity." (Response p. 7.) Respondents rely upon IRCP § 56(e) for this 
proposition. In fact, Respondents' brief mis-quotes Rule 56( e) to state "items offered in support of or 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be attached to the party's affidavit verifying the 
items' authenticity." (Id.) No such statement exists in the rule, vvhich in actuality consists of the 
following which further confirms that depositions are considered separately and distinct from affidavits: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall shovv affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or 
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court 
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed bv depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. 
IRCP § 56( e )(emphasis added) 
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As well founded in oft cited authority. the deposition testimony of Dr. Karie Jonak and Carla 
Elliot do not need to come in by affidavit and should have been considered by the District Court to 
determine the potential of materially disputed facts that warrant a denial of summary judgment. In 
J-icCoy v. Lyons,120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991), the Supreme Court unequivocally holds that 
"othenvise provided in this rule" under IRCP § 56( e) refers to deposition testimony nor attached to 
affidavits submitted in response to the motion. 
The A1cCoy Cou11 stages the issue by indicating: 
It is unquestioned that the heirs did not submit affidavits to oppose the motion for summary 
judgment. Therefore, the panicular issue before us is whether the plaintiff-heirs complied with 
the requirements as "otherwise provided in this rule" and whether they were required to further 
respond to Lyons' motion. 
ld.120 Idaho 771, 820 P.2d at 365. 
The Court then answers the issue posed by interpreting Rule 56(e) to liberally require the trial court 
consider anything that may be in the record other than the "bare allegations contained in the pleadings" 
that suggests that there are "genuine issues" for trial: 
While Rule 56(e) ordinarily requires the non-moving party to submit affidavits, depositions or 
other statements of "personal knowledge" which would be "admissible in evidence" at trial to 
refute the affidavits of the moving party, I.R.C.P. 56(e); see also Petricevich v. Salmon River 
Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,869,452 P.2d 362, 366 (1969), in this case both Lyons and the 
heirs chose to rely on the amended verified complaint and the depositions on file. There is 
nothing in Rule 56( e) which precludes the plaintiff-heirs from relying on their own depositions, 
which were part of the record, to refute the arguments of the moving party based on those same 
depositions. All that Rule 56( e) requires is that the non-movinQ partv not rest solely upon the 
bare alleQations contained in the pleadirnzs. The non-moving partv must merely introduce 
evidence to support that which "set[s] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). The sworn statements contained in the amended verified complaint, 
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and the heirs' depositions satisfy the 
( emphasis added) 
This interpretation of Rule 56( e) has been followed or reinforced numerous times including, for 
example. in Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 188 P.3d 854, 860, 145 Idaho 
912, 918 (2008), which holds: 
A motion for summary judgment can be countered by S\Vom statements in the record that 
comply with Rule 56( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 1vfcCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 
765,820 P.2d 360 (1991). Those statements can be in affidavits, depositions, or in a verified 
pleading. 
Id. ( emphasis added) 
Given this very clear authority, it was an error for the District Court not to consider Dr. Jonak 
and Ms. Elli of s depositions simply because they were not attached to an affidavit. Summary judgment 
should therefore not have been entered without due consideration as to whether the deposition 
testimony of these indi\'iduals - construed in most favorable light to Path as the non-moving party-
created issues of material fact that should be decided by a jury. 1 That error in itself warrants a reversal 
of the summary judgment dismissing Path· s claims. 
1 As reiterated in the Appellant Brief, both Dr. Jonak and Ms. Elliot testified that the realtor 
Daren Long repeatedly represented to and assured Path that the property was commercially zoned and 
that there would be no problem with the zoning. App. Brief pp. 6-7. This testimony lends a great deal 
of support toward Path's claims of misrepresentation and reliance upon that misrepresentation. 
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II. The District Court and the Supreme Court Cannot Make Determinations on 
Conflicting Evidence in a Summary Judgment Motion. 
The Respondents devote a substantial portion of their brief parsing testimony and/or documents 
to refute the factual allegations set forth in Path's Appellant Brief. (Response Brief pp. 2-5, 10-12, and 
generally.) In so doing, the Respondents mis-interpret the standard of review on a summary judgment 
motion, and in fact have provided additional basis for the District Court's err in finding summary 
judgment when there were clearly disputed facts. 
The trial court's limited and restricted role in making factual determinations in summary 
judgment motions was recently reiterated and emphasized by this Court in Sield v. Pocatello Health 
Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho 845, 857, 332 P.3d 714, 757 (2014). 
As we have reiterated in our recent cases, upon a motion for summary judgment. all disputed 
facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. The burden of proving the 
absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party. This burden is onerous 
because even " [ c ]ircumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact." Moreover, 
all reasonable inferences which can be made from the record shall be made in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. If the record contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied because all doubts are 
to be resolved against the moving party. The requirement that all reasonable inferences be 
construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party is a strict one. Nevertheless, when 
a party moves for summary judgment the opposing party's case must not rest on mere 
speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. 
Notwithstanding the utility of a summary judgment, a motion for summary judgment should be 
granted with caution. Furthermore, it is well-established that on summary judgment, a trial 
court is not ailowed to weigh the evidence and resolve all doubts against the movant: 
The trial court, when confronted by a motion for summary judgment, must determine if there are 
factual issues vvhich should be resolved by the trier of facts. On such a motion it is not the 
function of the trial court to weigh the evidence or to determine those issues. Moreover, all 
doubts must be resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment. 
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Additionally, a motion for summary judgment should be denied if the pleadings. admissions, 
depositions, and affidavits raise any question of credibility of witnesses or weight of the 
evidence. 
Id. ( citations omitted) 
In essence, the District Court and this Court overstep their bounds 'When they make 
conclusions, weigh evidence or even inferences \\'ith regard to conflicting facts in the case. That 
responsibility squarely belongs with the jury. Yet, Respondents are asking that the Court usurp the 
jury's role by making such conclusions. 
Path's appeal can be boiled down as thus: There is \Vithout question conflicting testimony as to 
\vhether the Respondents (i.e. the realtors) made misleading representations to Path with regard to the 
zoning on the subject Property, and/or failed to disclose material facts with regard to the Property to 
-which the realtor was aware, which induced Path into making the purchase and its subsequent 
damages. Such misconduct by the Respondents constitutes negligence per se under IC § 54-2087, a 
breach of contract (v,foch clearly incorporates the realtor duties under IC § 54-2087 regardless of 
whether the contract can be retroactively applied or not), and/or fraudulent misrepresentation. If there 
is even one piece of evidence that supports any one of these claims, then it was an error for the District 
Court to grant summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing, this Court should reverse the District Court's decision to dismiss 
Path's complaint on summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certif),· that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, v,-ith my office in Idaho 
Falls. Idaho, and that on the ] 6th day of September, 2015. I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage thereon, or 
by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b ), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Donald F. Carey, Esq. 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Dr, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405-1388 
FAX: (208) 529-0005 
El\1 A IL: d fcarev@carevnerki ns. com 
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